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CIVIL LIBERTY OR NATIONAL SECURITY: THE
BATTLE OVER IPHONE ENCRYPTION
Karen G. Lowell*
INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 2013,1 Edward Snowden2 released what would be the
first of many documents exposing the vast breadth of electronic
surveillance the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
National Security Agency (NSA) had been conducting on millions of
United States citizens.3 Although the federal agencies had legal
authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to
collect metadata from companies such as Verizon, many Americans
considered this data collection to be a massive invasion of privacy.4
Equipped with the knowledge of sweeping domestic surveillance
programs, citizens and technology firms fighting for strong privacy
and security protection, have started to take matters into their own
hands.5 Most notably, Apple responded in 2014 by announcing that
its operating system, iOS 8, now prevents anyone—including both
*
J.D. Candidate 2017, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to first thank my husband,
Evan, for his constant support and encouragement, and my family for their love and patience during this
journey. I would also like to thank Professor Caren Morrison for her insightful feedback and edits
during the revision process.
1. Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files - Timeline, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 5:54
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline.
2. “Edward Snowden is a former National Security Agency subcontractor who made headlines in
2013 when he leaked top-secret information about NSA surveillance activities.” Edward Snowden
Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/edward-snowden-21262897#synopsis
(last visited Dec. 9, 2016).
3. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phonerecords-verizon-court-order; see Joshua Eaton, Timeline of Edward Snowden’s Revelations, AL JAZEERA
AM., http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/multimedia/timeline-edward-snowden-revelations.html (last
visited Dec. 9, 2016) (organizing the release of all articles related to Edward Snowden and his disclosure
of NSA surveillance methods).
4. Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Anger Swells After NSA Phone Records Court Order
Revelation, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 9:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/
obama-administration-nsa-verizon-records.
5. Alex Hern, Apple Defies FBI and Offers Encryption by Default on New Operating System,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2014, 1:57 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/17/appledefies-fbi-encryption-mac-osx.
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Apple and law enforcement—from bypassing the device owner’s
consent in order to access any data on the smartphone or tablet.6
Google, Facebook, Yahoo, and Microsoft followed suit soon after.7
Standing in contrast to privacy supporters are national security
advocates.8 For months now, the FBI and NSA have expressed great
concern for public safety as their ability to collect both real-time data
and stored data from terrorists and criminals has been “crippled” by
encryption.9 The FBI’s fears came to fruition through the deadly
attacks in both Paris and San Bernardino, California where the
attackers allegedly used encryption to avoid detection.10 Encryption
is not only a national security issue, however, as it also affects local
law enforcement’s ability to solve criminal cases.11 For example, the
6. Elise Hu, Apple: iOS 8 Prevents Cooperation with Police Unlocking Requests, NPR (Sept. 18,
2014, 12:16 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/18/349561490/apple-ios-8prevents-cooperation-with-police-unlocking-requests.
7. Pamela Brown & Evan Perez, FBI Tells Apple, Google, Their Privacy Efforts Could Hamstring
Investigations, CNN: POL., http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/25/politics/fbi-apple-google-privacy/
index.html (last updated Oct. 12, 2014); Andrea Peterson, Yahoo’s Plan to Get Mail Users to Encrypt
Their E-mail: Make It Simple, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2015/03/15/yahoos-plan-to-get-mail-users-to-encrypt-their-e-mail-make-it-simple/.
8. Damian Paletta, Silicon Valley Faces Showdown as Lawmakers Fume over Encryption, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2015, 11:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/12/10/silicon-valley-facesshowdown-as-lawmakers-fume-over-encryption/; Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, Paris Attackers
Likely Used Encrypted Apps, Officials Say, CNN: POL. (Dec. 17, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/politics/paris-attacks-terrorists-encryption/index.html#.
9. Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 6–16 (2001) [hereinafter Going Dark] (statement of Valerie Caproni, General Counsel, Fed.
Bureau of Investigation); James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at the
International Association of Chiefs of Police 121st Annual Conference: The FBI and the IACP: Facing
Challenges Together (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbi-and-the-iacp-facingchallenges-together. But see Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 466–70 (2012). Although law enforcement may be losing one avenue of
electronic surveillance to encryption, there has never been a time when more technology innovations are
available to increase law enforcement’s capabilities. Id. at 470.
10. Paletta, supra note 8; Eric Lichtblau & Joseph Goldstein, Justice Dept. Appeals Ruling in Apple
iPhone Case in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/technology/
justice-dept-appeals-ruling-in-apple-iphone-case-in-brooklyn.html. But see Mike Masnick, The Paris
Attacks and the Encryption/Surveillance Bogeyman: The Story So Far, TECHDIRT (Nov. 19, 2015, 11:48
AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20151119/06374432860/paris-attacks-encryptionsurveillancebogeyman-story-so-far.shtml (noting that some terrorists likely used unencrypted SMS to
communicate).
11. See Nicole Arce, Manhattan DA Blames Apple Encryption for Failing to Solve 111 Criminal
Cases, TECH TIMES (Nov. 19, 2015 3:52 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/108322/20151119/
manhattan-da-blames-apple-encryption-for-failing-to-solve-111-criminal-cases.htm.
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Manhattan District Attorney’s Office has reported that “roughly 111”
cases—involving homicide, attempted murder, child sexual abuse,
sex trafficking, and assault and robbery—went unsolved last year due
to cell phone encryption.12
In the past, the FBI was able to serve a court order to
telecommunication providers, and the providers were then required to
intercept and provide communications to law enforcement.13
Currently, however, either law enforcement no longer serves such
court orders on technology firms, such as Apple, or the firms simply
reject and return the court orders because they do not have the means
to access the requested data due to encryption.14 The FBI refers to
this increasing disparity between legal authority and technological
capabilities as “going dark.”15 This dark realm of electronic
communications is a forum “where pedophiles can’t be seen,
kidnappers can’t be seen, [and] drug dealers can’t be seen.”16 To be
clear, the FBI claims it is not opposed to privacy protection; rather,
the FBI supports such measures so long as a “legal framework” or
another solution exists that will enable law enforcement to access
encrypted communications when probable cause of criminal activity
arises.17
With law enforcement and privacy advocates settling on opposite
ends of the debate, cooperation and compromise seems unlikely.18
Therefore, Congress will likely have to weigh in on the issue to find
an amicable solution that balances the needs of law enforcement
against the privacy protections demanded by citizens.19
12. Id.
13. Going Dark, supra note 9, at 6–7.
14. Matt Apuzzo, David E. Sanger & Michael S. Schmidt, Apple and Other Tech Companies Tangle
with U.S. over Data Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/us/
politics/apple-and-other-tech-companies-tangle-with-us-over-access-to-data.html.
15. Going Dark, supra note 9, at 10.
16. Aaron Sankin, FBI Director Urges Congress to Crack Down on Encryption, DAILY DOT (Mar.
26, 2015, 3:33PM), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/james-comey-encryption-law-fbi/.
17. Sam Sacks, NSA Joins FBI in Fight Against Total Encryption, DIST. SENTINEL (Feb. 23, 2015),
https://www.districtsentinel.com/nsa-joins-fbi-in-fight-against-total-encryption/.
18. See Apuzzo, Sanger & Schmidt, supra note 14.
19. Id. (“Microsoft argues that Congress will ultimately have to weigh in on the issue, since it is as
much a political matter as a legal one: ‘Only Congress has the institutional competence and
constitutional authority to balance law enforcement needs against our nation’s sovereignty, the privacy
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This Note analyzes why certain communications on smartphones
should not be automatically encrypted if the provider does not have
the means to decrypt the communication. Although Congress
explicitly blocked past legislation from preventing unregulated
encryption, current technology trends unreasonably favor civil
liberties, undermining law enforcement’s ability to maintain a safe
society. Part I of this Note provides a basic understanding of
encryption while also outlining relevant wiretap statutes.20 Part II
provides both the legal background and an analysis using the
framework outlined in Katz as it applies to communications
transmitted through encrypted smartphones.21 Part II also outlines the
protections afforded to individuals by the Fourth Amendment as well
as relevant legislation for electronic surveillance and encryption.22
Part III of this Note recommends a legal framework for technology
firms that employ encryption software on smartphones.23
I. BACKGROUND
A. Encryption
As a result of the Edward Snowden leaks, headlines spouted titles
such as “Apple and Google Have Won Praise From Privacy
Proponents for Efforts to Encrypt Their Latest Smartphones.”24
Although encryption offers privacy benefits, it also cripples law
enforcement and, in turn, jeopardizes public safety.25
of its citizens and the competitiveness of its industry.’”). But see Cory Bennett, Top House Democrat:
Silicon Valley Asking for Encryption Proposal, THE HILL: POLICY (Sept. 10, 2015, 10:43 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/253205-top-house-intel-dem-silicon-valley-wants-to-seeencryption-proposal (Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Cal.) stating Congress will be of little help suggesting a
solution on the fight over encryption due to the complexity and political nature of the problem); Mike
Masnick, White House Realizes Mandating Backdoors to Encryption Isn’t Going to Happen, TECHDIRT
(Sept. 17, 2015, 8:17 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150916/15035232275/white-houserealizes-mandating-backdoors-to-encryption-isnt-going-to-happen.shtml (disclosing there is not enough
support from Congress to mandate a legislative backdoor to encryption).
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part III.
24. Brown & Perez, supra note 7.
25. James Comey, Encryption, Public Safety, and “Going Dark,” LAWFARE (Jul. 6, 2015, 10:38
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1. History
Despite the recent tension between Silicon Valley and the FBI and
NSA, encryption is not new technology. Cryptology first took the
main stage in the twentieth century during World War II when
Germany developed the Enigma machine to secretly communicate
with U-boats in the Atlantic Ocean.26 Once the Internet launched,
encryption became a hotly debated policy issue in the 1990s.27 As a
result, the federal government proposed a solution called the “Clipper
Chip,” which would protect private communications through
encryption while enabling the government to decrypt the
communications through a permitted “key.”28 Due to extreme
controversy, however, the program was abandoned by 1996.29 Soon
after, the “crypto wars” died down.30 Recently, the threat of security
breaches and warrantless searches has rekindled the debate.
2. How Encryption Works
Put simply, encryption is the process of rendering information
indecipherable except to the people holding an authorized electronic
key.31 A “key” consists of ones or zeros, which computers then use in

AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/encryption-public-safety-and-going-dark.
26. Swire & Ahmad, supra note 9, at 425–26. Unlike the Enigma machine, which was broken by the
“Ultra” project, modern encryption programs are resistant to “brute force” attacks where a computer
program essentially tries every possible key combination until a working key is discovered. Chris
Hoffman, Brute-Force Attacks Explained: How All Encryption Is Vulnerable, HOW-TO GEEK (Jul. 6,
2013),
http://www.howtogeek.com/166832/brute-force-attacks-explained-how-all-encryption-isvulnerable/; see, e.g., Dena R. Klopfenstein, Comment, Deciphering the Encryption Debate: A
Constitutional Analysis of Current Regulations and a Prediction for the Future, 48 EMORY L.J. 765, 772
(1999) (noting that in 1996, former NSA director William Crowell told the House Committee on
National Security that a 56-digit encryption key took internet participants 96 days using 78,000
computers simultaneously to decipher; a 65-bit encryption would likely take about 6,000 to 7,000 years;
and a “128-bit encrypted message would take 8.6 trillion times the ‘age of the universe’ to crack”).
27. Swire & Ahmad, supra note 9, at 433.
28. Clipper Chip, CRYPTO MUSEUM, http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/usa/clipper.htm (last
updated July 26, 2016).
29. Id.
30. Swire & Ahmad, supra note 9, at 433 (noting that in 1999, the Clinton administration ended the
“crypto war” by changing its position and accepting widespread encryption use).
31. David B. Walker, Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption Policy—A Call for Congressional
Action, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 14.
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a complex algorithm to scramble the text.32 Once the algorithm
scrambles the information, the message can only be decrypted by
either a recipient who holds the authorized key or through a “brute
force” attack.33 Thus, the longer the key, the longer a computer will
have to work to try and break the code using brute force.34
a. Private or Symmetric Key
Private Key encryption requires both the sender and the recipient
of a message to use the same single key to encrypt and decrypt the
information.35 Therefore, a message is only secure if the key is kept
private.36 Once the key has been compromised, anyone can later use
the key to access or send encrypted information.37 The significant
barrier with maintaining a secure key is resolving how to safely share

32. Id. (explaining that electronic keys consist of zeros and ones, usually at least forty in length or
longer, that encryption software uses to convert the intended text into an unreadable format until
decrypted by the intended recipient); Klopfenstein, supra note 26, at 771 (noting more specifically that
computers convert data by using ones and zeros in an algorithm to scramble information).
33. Klopfenstein, supra note 26, at 767, 772. Currently, most cryptographic systems use a 128-bit or
256-bit
symmetric
key;
that
means
there
are
2128
or
340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 possible key combinations in a 128-bit
symmetric key. Cracking Encryption Algorithms, MYCRYPTO.NET, http://mycrypto.net/encryption/
encryption_crack.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2016). Meaning, if all 7 billion people on the planet owned
ten supercomputers from the year 2012, with each computer testing 1 billion key combinations per
second, it would take about 77,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 years to succeed in a brute-force
attack on a 128-bit symmetric key. Mohit Arora, Sr., How Secure Is AES Against Brute Force Attacks?,
EETIMES: DESIGNLINES (May 7, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?
doc_id=1279619. On a four-digit iPhone password, however, it can take as little as thirty minutes to
correctly guess the combination. Alina Selyukh, Apple, the FBI and iPhone Encryption: A Look at
What’s at Stake, NPR (Feb. 17, 2016, 4:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/02/17/467096705/apple-the-fbi-and-iphone-encryption-a-look-at-whats-at-stake.
Furthermore, it would take about five years to break a six-digit alphanumeric password containing
lower-case letters and numbers. Zach Whittaker, For iPhone, iPad Privacy, Here’s How to Turn on
Encryption in Just One Minute: Enabling Encryption on Your Apple Smartphone or Tablet Is Easier
Than You Think, ZDNET (May 27, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-to-turn-on-iphone-ipadencryption-in-one-minute/.
34. Klopfenstein, supra note 26, at 771–72.
35. Elizabeth Lauzon, Note, The Philip Zimmermann Investigation: The Start of the Fall of Export
Restrictions on Encryption Software Under First Amendment Free Speech, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1307,
1315 (1998).
36. William A. Hodkowski, Comment, The Future of Internet Security: How New Technologies Will
Shape the Internet and Affect the Law, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 217, 227
(1997).
37. Id. at 229.
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your key with the intended recipient.38 Philip Zimmermann, a famous
cryptography programmer, said it best, “If you have a secure channel
for exchanging keys, then why do you need cryptography in the first
place?”39
b. Public or Asymmetrical Key
Public key encryption was developed after realizing the practical
shortcomings of private keys.40 Rather than using the same key to
both encrypt and decrypt a message, a public key uses three separate
authorized keys: a known public key; a private key to encrypt; and
another distinct private key to decrypt.41 Each individual involved
has both a public key and a private key.42 To send a message to an
individual, the sender would use his private key in combination with
the recipient’s publically available key to encrypt the message.43 The
recipient would then use his private key to decrypt the text.44 By
using a public key system, individuals bypass the problematic step of
having to find a way to securely disclose the private key before being
able to communicate privately.45

38. Id. at 227.
39. Export Controls on Mass Market Software: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy,
Trade and Env’t of the H. Comm. of Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong. 110 (1993) (statement of Phillip
Zimmerman, Cryptograph Consultant).
40. Lauzon, supra note 35, at 1317–18 (finding that public key encryption was developed because
private keys proved difficult to distribute securely, especially to large groups).
41. Id. at 1318.
42. Swire & Ahmad, supra note 9, at 427.
43. Id.
44. Id. Swire and Ahmad provide the following example:
The recipient Bob has a public key that everyone can access. Bob also has a
secret, private key that allows him to decrypt these messages. Though Bob
publishes his public key he does not tell anyone his private key, not even Alice.
When Alice wants to send Bob a message, she wraps the message in his
publically available key, and then sends it in encrypted form to her ISP where it
travels through the network to Bob’s ISP and eventually reaches Bob. Upon
receipt, Bob uses his private key to unwrap the message and read its plaintext
contents. Figure 5 illustrates the structure of a public key encryption system. If
Bob wants to reply back to Alice, he wraps his message in her public key and
then she unwraps it using her private key.
Id.
45. Id. at 428.
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B. Domestic Law Enforcement and Related Congressional Action
Surveillance is a useful tactic for those who employ it to provide
insight and security for the population.46 Although surveillance is
often used for the good of the nation to effectively prosecute
criminals and to ensure public safety, electronic surveillance also has
a history of governmental abuse.47 Thus, Congress has enacted
several statutes that bolster Fourth Amendment protections from
unwarranted invasions of privacy.48
1. Early Electronic Surveillance History
Communications surveillance, specifically telephone wiretapping,
developed shortly after Alexander Graham Bell invented the
telephone in 1876.49 The FBI and private detectives alike tapped into
wires for decades, despite many state legislatures outright banning
the practice due to its intrusive nature.50 The constitutionality of
wiretapping was not addressed, however, until 1928 in Olmstead v.
United States where a Seattle bootlegger was convicted based on
evidence obtained through a wiretap.51 Olmstead moved to suppress
the evidence, claiming the wiretap invaded his Fourth Amendment
protections, but the Court held the wiretap did not amount to a
“search” because no physical trespass onto Olmstead’s property
occurred.52 The American public was outraged by the Court’s
disregard of Fourth Amendment protections in Olmstead.53
46. Daniel J. Solove, Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1266 (2004).
47. See id. at 1266–67.
48. See id. at 1266.
49. Tom
Harris,
How
Wiretapping
Works,
HOWSTUFFWORKS:
CULTURE,
http://people.howstuffworks.com/wiretapping3.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2016) (recounting the history
of telephone wiretapping). “In the 1860s, before the modern telephone was even invented, many state
courts in the United States enacted statutes that prohibited anybody from listening in on telegraph
communication. By the 1890s, the modern telephone was in widespread use—and so was wiretapping.”
Id.
50. Howard J. Kaplan, Joseph A. Matteo & Richard Sillett, The History and Law of Wiretapping,
2012 A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIG. 2.
51. William Lee Adams, Brief History: Wiretapping, TIME (Oct. 11, 2010), http://content.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,2022653,00.html.
52. Id.
53. David Price, A Social History of Wiretaps, COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/08/09/a-social-history-of-wiretaps-2/.
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In response to the public’s outcry against the Supreme Court
permitting unrestricted wiretapping, Congress passed the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, which made wiretapping illegal and
deemed all wiretap evidence inadmissible in court.54 However, J.
Edgar Hoover, former FBI director, was not deterred by the law’s
passage.55 Although the FBI maintained a public façade of
prohibiting the use of wiretaps, it continued to use wiretaps in secret,
even lying to Congress.56 Hoover went onto expand illegal wiretap
use even more by appealing to public fears claiming that wiretaps
were necessary to investigate spies, Nazis, and communists.57
Despite the illegality of the FBI’s activity, it never incurred
sanctions, even after courts eventually learned of the FBI’s illicit
wiretapping.58 In 1967, wiretapping returned to the Supreme Court’s
attention in Katz v. United States.59 Katz replaced Olmstead by ruling
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their person,
and not just in the context of property rights.60

54. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1982)) (enacting legislation “[t]o provide for the regulation of interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio, and for other purposes”); Kaplan, Matteo, & Sillett, supra note 50, at
3.
55. See Price, supra note 53.
56. Id.
57. Id. The history of government wiretapping is shrouded in secrecy. As Price recounted:
President Roosevelt issued a secret executive order authorizing widespread
Justice Department wire-taps of “subversives” and suspected spies. Hoover used
these vague new powers to investigate not just Nazis but anyone he thought
subversive. . . . The social history of wiretaps is a history of mission creep, where
FBI agents initially hunting for wartime Nazi spies soon monitored progressive
activists fighting racial segregation.
Id. The FBI would also use illegal wiretaps during the McCarthy era to target suspected communists,
civil rights activists, and other progressive groups. Id.
58. Id.
59. Alex Markels, Timeline: Wiretaps’ Use and Abuse, NPR (Dec. 20, 2005, 12;00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5061834; see also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (holding an electronic wiretap of a phone booth unconstitutional, reasoning
“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches
and seizures,” and “No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”).
60. Kaplan, Matteo & Sillett, supra note 50, at 3–4.
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2. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of
1968
The year following Katz, Congress responded to growing gang
violence in America by passing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, also commonly known as “The Wiretap Act.”61
Title III of this Act permits the interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications through wiretapping.62 The Act
authorizes wiretapping for twenty-six enumerated crimes only if the
proper steps are followed including obtaining a valid court order
founded upon probable cause.63 The USA Patriot Act later enhanced
Title III to permit investigations into terrorism and national security
threats.64
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
After Watergate and Nixon’s resignation in 1974, Senator Frank
Church established a committee to investigate a report revealing
large-scale, warrantless searches conducted by the FBI and CIA.65
The committee discovered that the executive branch had overreached
its authority by pervasively invading the civil liberties of citizens.66
Thus, the pendulum continued to swing in favor of public policy
advocating for civil liberties.
The federal government does not need a warrant to collect
communications if foreign adversaries or terrorists communicate
61. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510) (stating its purpose was “[t]o assist State and local
governments in reducing the incidence of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination
of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of government, and for other purposes”);
Markels, supra note 59; Privacy: Wiretap Act, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://ilt.eff.org/index.php/
Privacy:_Wiretap_Act (last modified Jan. 28, 2007) (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 is also known as “The Wiretap Act”).
62. JAMES A. ADAMS & DANIEL D. BLINKA, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: COMMENTARIES &
STATUTES 16 (2003-2004 ed. 2003).
63. Laura K. Donohue, Criminal Law: Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1078–79 (2006).
64. ADAMS & BLINKA, supra note 62, at 19.
65. See Tom Head, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), ABOUT.COM: CIVIL
LIBERTIES, http://civilliberty.about.com/od/waronterror/tp/History-of-FISA.htm (last visited Dec. 15,
2016).
66. Id.
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outside of the United States.67 Once a communication from a terrorist
or foreign adversary penetrates the United States, however,
intelligence officials are required to show probable cause before
collecting targeted communications.68 The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) was therefore established as the
“exclusive means” to patrol physical searches and foreign
intelligence surveillance occurring in the United States.69 In order to
conduct a physical search or electronic surveillance, the FBI must
establish probable cause that the target is a “foreign power” or “an
agent of a foreign power” and that the purpose of the surveillance is
to collect foreign intelligence.70 The warrants are then secretly
reviewed and either approved or rejected by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, which was created by FISA.71 In 2005, The New
York Times revealed that President Bush authorized warrantless
surveillance of communications connected to Al-Qaeda, which
became known as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program.”72 Although
67. ERIC ROSENBACH & AKI J. PERITZ, Electronic Surveillance and FISA, in CONFRONTATION OR
COLLABORATION?: CONGRESS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 69 (2009), http://belfercenter.ksg.
harvard.edu/publication/19156/electronic_surveillance_and_fisa.html.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 70.
70. The USA Patriot Act changed the primary “purpose” requirement of a FISA warrant to a
“significant purpose.” Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102(b), 92
Stat. 1783 (amended by Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) and codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B); see also infra p. 25–26 and note 93. Rosenbach and Peritz explained:
Under FISA, U.S. citizens, legal residents and U.S. corporations (known as “U.S.
persons”) are protected against illegal search and seizure by the Fourth
Amendment; hence, FISA includes a number of provisions to protect civil
liberties. Furthermore, FISA also explicitly states that, “no United States person
may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the
basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.” While surveillance of U.S. persons is permitted under FISA, the
IC must “minimize” the collection of information not directly applicable to the
intended target.
ROSENBACH & PERITZ, supra note 67, at 69.
71. Head, supra note 65; Bill Moyers, The Church Committee and FISA, PBS (Oct. 26, 2007),
http://genius.com/Public-broadcasting-service-the-church-committee-and-fisa-annotated (the FISA court
consists of seven judges who are appointed by the Chief Justice and serve on the court for seven years);
Jason Sattler, FISA Court Has Only Rejected 10 of 20,909 Spying Requests: One Congressman Has a
Solution, NAT’L MEMO (Sept. 20, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://www.nationalmemo.com/fisa-court-has-onlyrejected-10-of-20909-spying-requests-one-congressman-has-a-solution/ (“Between 2001 and 2012, the
court heard 20,909 surveillance and property search warrants and rejected just 10.”).
72. ROSENBACH & PERITZ, supra note 67, at 69; Ben Johnson, Impeaching “Big Brother”?,
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there is still a debate as to whether the President had the legal
authority to authorize surveillance, then Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales clarified that President Bush was discontinuing the program
in 2007.73
4. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (“ECPA”), because emerging technologies threatened the right to
privacy.74 The ECPA codified the government’s legal authority to
access domestically stored electronic communications, and has since
expanded to include wire communications due to the USA Patriot
Act amendment.75 Typically, when an individual sends an electronic
communication, the message is temporarily stored within a local
network server or an Internet service provider server before being
opened by the intended recipient.76 Thus, ECPA is the appropriate
vehicle to retrieve wire and electronic communications that are
stored, rather than Title III, because the concept of “interception” is
not applicable while the message is temporarily in storage and not in
current transmission.77 Once the government realizes a stored
FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM (Dec. 21, 2005), http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?
ARTID=6171 (“The New York Times revealed in a front page story December 16th that the Bush
administration allowed the NSA to wiretap calls involving someone resident in the United States (N.B.:
not necessarily an American citizen) without seeking a court warrant, as long as at least one party to the
call was overseas and the American was a known al-Qaeda contact.”) (original emphasis).
73. ROSENBACH & PERITZ, supra note 67, at 70.
74. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (1986); Solove, supra
note 46, at 1277 (“House Report 647 noted that ‘legal protection against the unreasonable use of newer
surveillance techniques has not kept pace with technology.’ Additionally, Senate Report 541 mentioned
that threats to privacy in these new communications media ‘may unnecessarily discourage potential
customers from using innovative communications systems.’”).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1825(2)(a)(ii) (2000).
76. ADAMS & BLINKA, supra note 62, at 43–44.
77. Id. at 45; Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The
E-mail in issue was in ‘electronic storage.’ Congress’ use of the word ‘transfer’ in the definition of
‘electronic communication,’ and its omission in that definition of the phrase ‘any electronic storage of
such communication’ (part of the definition of ‘wire communication’) reflects that Congress did not
intend for ‘intercept’ to apply to ‘electronic communications’ when those communications are in
‘electronic storage.’”). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2012) (“‘[W]ire communication’ means any aural
transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by
the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of
reception . . . .”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (“‘[E]lectronic communication’ means any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
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communication exists and it would like to access the information, the
government must obtain a Fourth Amendment warrant.78
5. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
When telephone carriers switched from analog to digital networks
in the 1980s, law enforcement complained of chaos and difficulty
accessing various types of network structures due to technological
advances.79 After the FBI proved this difficultly created a significant
problem,80 Congress responded by passing the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) in 1994, which
required all U.S. telecommunication carriers to redesign their
network structures so that law enforcement officers could access both
content and call-identifying information in a timely manner.81 In
addition, CALEA provides further legal protection against the
unauthorized interception of communications for new technologies
not covered under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.82
Almost ten years later, Congress addressed an apparent
shortcoming of CALEA, which previously required only limited
types of communication providers to comply with the statute.83 In
2005, Congress expanded the term “telecommunications carriers”
under the Act to include broadband-service providers and
interconnected VoIP providers, such as Skype, after law enforcement
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system . . . but does not
include . . . any wire or oral communication . . . .”).
78. ADAMS & BLINKA, supra note 62, at 45.
79. John Edwards, The Instant Expert Guide to CALEA, VOIP-NEWS (Jul. 11, 2012),
http://web.archive.org/web/20120711144311/http://www.voip-news.com/feature/guide-calea-030608/.
80. 140 CONG. REC. 27,709 (1994) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman of the H. Subcomm.
on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights). The FBI submitted 183 cases from around the country where they
were having problems carrying out wiretaps due to new technologies. Id.
81. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 103, 108
Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1)–(4) (2012); Constance L. Martin, Note and Comment,
Exalted Technology: Should CALEA Be Expanded to Authorize Internet Wiretapping?, 32 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 140, 144 (2005); Edwards, supra note 79.
82. Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearing on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 3, 4
(1986) (testimony of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Vice Chairman of the Sen. Select Comm. on Intelligence).
83. Edwards, supra note 79.
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made additional requests due to the growth of computer-based
communications.84 Significantly, the FBI again compromised by
agreeing to exempt instant messaging and email, which were not a
vulnerability of great concern in 2004, from CALEA’s expanded
scope of coverage to get the law passed.85
6. The USA Patriot Act
After 9/11, the Bush administration realized the public leaned in
favor of equipping law enforcement with the necessary authority to
fight terrorism rather than constricting law enforcement to protect
civil liberties.86 Immediately following 9/11, the National
Commission on Terrorism reiterated this sentiment by stating that
“[p]riority one is to prevent terrorist attacks.”87 As a result, the USA
Patriot Act was passed in 2001, which seeks to use the full breadth of
law enforcement authority to gather intelligence on terrorist plans
and methods.88 It is therefore known as “one of the key legislative
tools in our fight against terrorism” because it updated surveillance
laws to accommodate technological advancements.89 As the Patriot
Act relates to electronic surveillance, it revamped Title III by adding
predicate offenses including terrorism-related offenses, chemical
weapon crimes, and computer-based crimes.90
84. Id.
85. Id.; Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act: Frequently Asked Questions,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/CALEA/?f=faq.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2016); Martin, supra note 81, at 169–70.
86. See Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29 BROOKLYN
J. INT’L L. 175, 216 (2003).
87. STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 107TH CONG., STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND
DEFENSE 5 (Comm. Print 2001). The National Commission on Terrorism is a congressionally mandated
bi-partisan body that assesses U.S. laws, policies, and practices for preventing and punishing terrorism
affecting U.S. citizens. RAPHAEL F. PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20598, NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON TERRORISM REPORT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2001); see also Act of Oct. 22,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 591, 112 Stat. 2681.
88. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.) (“An act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the
world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”); STAFF OF THE S.
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 107TH CONG., STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE 5 (Comm. Print
2001).
89. Martin, supra note 81, at 157.
90. ADAMS & BLINKA, supra note 62, at 19.
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For all the alleged good that the Patriot Act accomplished, such as
improving communication between the intelligence and law
enforcement communities, those in favor of protecting civil liberties
vehemently oppose it.91 In 2002, Gerald Waldron, a former litigator
for groups opposed to CALEA, said, “I see the Patriot Act as in some
ways an extension of CALEA. Law enforcement is trying to get
things they couldn’t get under CALEA,” such as roving wiretaps.92
The Patriot Act also amended ECPA by expanding the types of noncontent information the government could access from just
telecommunications data to records of all electronic communication
providers and remote computer services.93 Finally, the Patriot Act
broadened FISA’s scope to include investigations when foreign
intelligence gathering is “a significant purpose,” rather than the
primary purpose as was previously required.94
II. ANALYSIS
A. Fourth Amendment Constitutional Law
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “privacy” as “the quality or
state of being apart from company or observation” and the “freedom
from unauthorized intrusion.”95 The word “privacy,” however, never
actually appears in the U.S. Constitution.96 Despite this implied
assertion, the makers of our Constitution:
91. USA Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C.S. § 1806(k), 1825(k)(1) (2012); Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The
Making of the USA Patriot Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1146–47 (2004); Davis, supra note 86, at
218–19.
92. George A. Chidi, Jr., Privacy, Money Issues Delay New FCC Wiretapping Rules, IT WORLD
(Jan. 14, 2002), http://www.itworld.com/article/2793070/business/privacy—money-issues-delay-newfcc-wiretapping-rules.html.
93. ADAMS & BLINKA, supra note 62, at 46. As a result of changing FISA’s language from
“purpose” to “a significant purpose,” the USA Patriot Act “eliminated any justification for the FISC to
balance the relative weight the government places on criminal prosecution as compared to other
counterintelligence responses.” Solove, supra note 46, at 1291 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
717, 735 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)). “Only if the ‘government’s sole objective [is] merely to gain evidence
of past criminal conduct . . . the application should be denied.’” Id.
94. Solove, supra note 46, at 1290–91.
95. Privacy,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/privacy (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).
96. Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow, Ryan G. Fischer, & Connie Ireland, Quantifying Katz:
Empirically Measuring “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38
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conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.97
More specifically, the Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”98
The Supreme Court first discussed Fourth Amendment privacy
protections in Olmstead v. United States in 1928. As decided in
Olmstead, if the government intrudes into an individual’s spatial
privacy, it is required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause.99
Almost forty years later in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
expanded privacy protections to encompass people, and not just
places.100 Notably, Justice Harlan provided a two-part test in the
concurrence of Katz that has now been adopted as the contemporary
framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment protections: first, the
person seeking Fourth Amendment protection must “exhibit an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy;” and second, the subjective
expectation of privacy needs to be “one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”101 If there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy, then there is no Fourth Amendment protection, and thus, the
AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 291 (2011).
97. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
99. Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not
Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 9 (2013).
100. Id. at 10.
101. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Thus a man’s home is,
for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself
has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.”); Brian J.
Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protections, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 583, 593 (1989).
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“search” does not require a warrant based on probable cause.102 In an
era where technology is constantly expanding, deciding whether an
expectation of privacy is reasonable has created a great deal of debate
and ambiguity.103
1. Subjective Expectations of Privacy
To satisfy the first part of the Katz test, an individual must
demonstrate that he personally had “an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy.”104 For example, in United States v.
Chadwick, several men placed drugs in a solid footlocker, which was
sealed with both a regular trunk lock and padlock.105 After arresting
the owners of the footlocker, the government opened the footlocker
without receiving consent from the owners and without obtaining a
search warrant.106 The Court concluded “by placing personal effects
inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free from public
examination.”107 Therefore, agents were required to obtain a search
warrant before they could constitutionally open the footlocker.108
Additionally, in Bond v. United States, a bus passenger exhibited an
intent to preserve the privacy of his carry-on luggage when he used
an opaque canvas bag and placed the bag directly above him.109
Although the bag could be subjected to casual touching and handling,
the petitioner did not expect the bag to be physically manipulated by
police in an exploratory manner.110 Consequently, the court held the
border patrol agent violated the passenger’s Fourth Amendment
rights when the officer squeezed the passenger’s bag.111

102. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 (1979).
103. See Mitchell Waldman, Annotation, Expectation of Privacy in Internet Communications, 92
A.L.R. 5th 15, § 2(a); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 5 (2015).
104. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
105. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1977).
106. Id. at 4.
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id.
109. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336, 338 (2000).
110. Id. at 338–39.
111. Id. at 335, 339.
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Encryption is analogous to the locker in Chadwick or closing the
telephone booth door in Katz.112 Just as the locker kept its contents
sealed except to those with the key, encryption similarly keeps a
communication private by unrecognizably scrambling the content,
which can only be descrambled by an authorized key.113 It would
therefore be illogical to deny an expectation of privacy to a person
who uses encryption on his computer before sending a document,
when sending a sealed letter in an envelope or keeping an item in a
lockbox suffices to establish an expectation of privacy.114 In addition,
the mere fact that an encrypted document is nearly impossible to
decipher without the proper key further demonstrates that the
individual who encrypted the document expects that the document
will remain private, except to those with a corresponding key.115
Therefore, in situations where the court determines an individual
maintains a subjective expectation of privacy, such as when an
individual chooses to use encryption, the Fourth Amendment requires
law enforcement to secure a warrant, and not just probable cause,
before a search can be completed.116
2. Expectations of Privacy that Society Recognizes as Reasonable
Despite an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy, the
Supreme Court must also determine whether society is ready to find a
certain privacy expectation “reasonable.”117 For example, one may
have a legitimate expectation in keeping the contents of his luggage
private, but that subjective expectation is limited by society if a
112. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 4; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); Susan W.
Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement, Technology, and the Constitution, 7 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 123, 168 (2002).
113. Sean J. Edgett, Comment, Double-Clicking on Fourth Amendment Protection: Encryption
Creates a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 339, 350 (2003).
114. Id. (analogizing the reasonable expectation of privacy achieved through encryption to someone
locking an item in a “briefcase, home, or trunk”).
115. Id. at 365. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create
a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 523 (2001) (explaining the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy when using encryption depends on the strength of
encryption, which begs the question: “How strong an encryption is strong enough for a person to have a
reasonable expectation that it will remain private?”).
116. Edgett, supra note 113, at 364.
117. Kerr, supra note 115, at 507.
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customs officer decides to inspect the luggage at an international
border.118 This particular example demonstrates a scenario where
society has refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy,
supported by the fact that permissible inspection of containers by
border inspectors has been codified.119 Although “the Fourth
Amendment grants protection to the owner of every container that
conceals its contents from plain view[,] . . . the protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment varies in different settings.”120
Another example where Courts have distinguished expectations of
privacy is their differing treatment of postcards and sealed letters.121
Although both instruments are used to deliver communications,
postcards present numerous opportunities for their messages to be
read by others before arriving to their intended recipients, thereby
disqualifying postcards from any reasonable expectation of
privacy.122 On the contrary, courts have afforded sealed letters a
reasonable expectation of privacy ensuring that the police will not
intercept the letter’s message.123 Once the letter is delivered,
however, the sender’s expectation of privacy terminates.124
In regard to technology and surveillance, the Court often considers
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable by balancing
citizens’ right to feel secure with law enforcement’s need to
investigate a situation effectively and efficiently.125 Proponents of
118. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982).
119. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2012).
120. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822–23 (holding that although an individual may expect privacy in his luggage,
his expectation of privacy is irrelevant when the luggage is checked by a customs officer as the traveler
crosses into another country). The court reasoned through analogy:
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who
carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the
sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case.
Id. at 822.
121. See Scott A. Sundstrom, Note, You’ve Got Mail! (And The Government Knows It): Applying the
Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-Mail Monitoring, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2064, 2082–84 (1998).
122. See generally Robert L. McArthur, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 3 ETHICS & INFO.
TECH. 123–28 (2001).
123. Sundstrom, supra note 121, at 2084.
124. United States v. Jones, 149 F. App’x 954, 959 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. King, 55
F.3d 1193, 1195–96 (6th Cir. 1995)).
125. Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st
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civil liberties would ideally like all citizens to be “free from secret
government surveillance at all times.”126 This ideology is unfeasible,
however, in a world that also must maintain “adequate levels of
effective law enforcement and national security.”127
Although the Court has used the Katz framework for several
electronic surveillance cases,128 it has not applied Katz to the Internet,
or more specifically, encryption.129 Nonetheless, other courts have
issued opinions regarding the expectations of privacy afforded to text
messages and emails.130 For example, a few courts, most notably the
Ninth Circuit, ruled that individuals do in fact hold an expectation of
privacy in their phones and text messages.131 Similarly, some courts
have analogized sealed letters to emails, noting that both are sent and
lie private until opened.132 Both letters and emails maintain an
expectation of privacy until the messages are accessed.133 Based on
the inconclusive and sparse court rulings, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged “the recently minted standard of electronic
communication via e-mails, text messages, and other means opens a
new frontier in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has been little
explored.”134 It is evident that as technology develops and changes,
so too must reasonable expectations of privacy in order to adequately
balance competing interests.135 Even without a Court ruling on

Century, 63 CASE W. RES. 187, 200 (2012); Brenner, supra note 112, at 166.
126. Pesciotta, supra note 125, at 224–25.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (holding the Fourth Amendment protected the
defendant from a warrantless GPS search of his vehicle); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–81,
285 (1983) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to a beeper that had been placed in a container of
chloroform since it only allowed law enforcement to monitor the location of the container).
129. See Pesciotta, supra note 125, at 215.
130. Individual Lacks Expectation of Privacy in Text Messages or Numbers Dialed, No Standing to
Object to Subpoena, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.bna.com/individual-lacks-expectationof-privacy-in-text-messages.
131. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 910 (2008), rev’d sub nom, City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 763 (2010).
132. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
133. Id.
134. Quon, 529 F.3d at 904.
135. See generally Brenner, supra note 112.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss2/5

20

Lowell: Civil Liberty or National Security: The Battle Over iPhone Encryption

2017]

BATTLE OVER IPHONE ENCRYPTION

505

encryption, some scholars suggest that society, in some instances,
would be ready to recognize such an expectation of privacy.136
B. The Path to CALEA
To enact CALEA, lawmakers and relevant parties were diligent
and cooperative in finding a way to balance the interests of law
enforcement with those of the telecommunications industry and the
civil liberties of Americans.137 The goal, after all, was not to reverse
telecommunications growth, but to ensure the industry’s cooperation
with law enforcement as the industry developed new technology.138
Therefore, one of law enforcement’s biggest compromises in
CALEA was to explicitly permit subscribers to use encryption while
also not requiring communication carriers to decrypt
communications.139 Communication carriers are only required to
decrypt communications if they have the means to do so.140 In fact,
no section of CALEA prohibits a carrier or technology company,
such as Apple, from “deploying an encryption service for which it
does not retain the ability to decrypt communications for law
enforcement access.”141
With law enforcement “increasingly handcuffed in preventing and
solving crimes due to the encryption that protects the perpetrators,”142
136. David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2223, 2232 (2009)
(“Cloud computing has added an ‘anywhere-access’ function to Internet usage which provides a
reasonable justification for storing private materials in the cloud. . . . Certainly in many ways the
Internet remains, as one court put it, ‘an indisputably, public medium,’ but even that court qualified its
statement with an acknowledgment that measures could be taken to protect information stored there.
The evolving, anywhere-access function of the Internet makes the cloud a public medium into which
private items are increasingly - and reasonably - placed, interacted with, and stored.”).
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, pt. 1, at 13 (1994).
138. Id. at 13, 15.
139. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3) (2012) (specifying that “a telecommunications carrier shall not be
responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any communication
encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier
possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication”); Lillian R. BeVier, The
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of
AT&T, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1075, 1079 (1999).
140. Jeffrey Yeates, CALEA and the RIPA: The U.S. and the U.K. Responses to Wiretapping in an
Increasingly Wireless World, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 141 (2001).
141. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, pt. 1, at 24 (1994).
142. Scripps News/Toronto Star Investigation Reveals How Encryption Technology Hampers Law
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the FBI currently suggests amending CALEA to require compliance
from Internet communication providers and exclude the encryption
exception found in the 1994 version of the Act.143 Valerie Caproni,
general counsel for the FBI, stated, “We’re not talking [about]
expanding authority. We’re talking about preserving our ability to
execute our existing authority in order to protect the public safety and
national security.”144 Essentially, law enforcement would be
“prevent[ing] the erosion of their investigative power,” which
encryption currently challenges.145
Although the FBI conceded on encryption when CALEA was
originally passed in 1994, the FBI is now fighting to include an
encryption provision that would again enable them to effectuate
authorized wiretap orders.146 Those opposed to expanding CALEA
maintain that mandatory encryption key access is not within
CALEA’s reach147 because such an expansion of CALEA will
“fundamentally chang[e] how the government regulates
technology.”148 Opponents also argue that by requiring a back door to
encryption, the FBI is arguing for weaker encryption when they
should actually be helping Americans increase device security to
prevent breaches.149

Enforcement, BUS. JS. (Nov. 5, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/prnewswire/press_
releases/2015/11/05/CL48792; see Cory Bennett, Apple Couldn’t Comply with Warrant Because of
Encryption, HILL (Sept. 8, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/252896-applerebuffed-warrant-because-of-encryption.
143. Scott Brady, Note, Keeping Secrets: A Constitutional Examination of Encryption Regulations in
the United States and India, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 333 (2012); Charlie Savage, U.S.
Weighs Wide Overhaul of Wiretap Laws, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/
08/us/politics/obama-may-back-fbi-plan-to-wiretap-web-users.html?ref=charliesavage&_r=0.
144. Brady, supra note 143, at 334; Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make it Easier to Wiretap the
Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
145. Brady, supra note 143, at 334.
146. Id. at 333.
147. Id.
148. Christopher Soghoian, CALEA and Encryption, SLIGHT PARANOIA BLOG (Sept. 28, 2010, 3:59
PM), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2010/09/calea-and-encryption.html.
149. Cindy Cohn, EFF Response to FBI Director Comey’s Speech on Encryption, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2004), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/eff-response-fbi-director-comeysspeech-encryption.
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III. PROPOSAL
Although no simple comprehensive solution exists on which
parties on either side of the issue will unanimously agree, neither
side’s policies should go unchecked. As the debate currently stands,
the FBI and NSA seem to be the only side receiving backlash, while
technology firms have resisted compromise by deeming potential
solutions counter-productive to their interests.150 Technology firms
certainly have a strong position in defending secured
communications,151 but their policies should not dominate, especially
considering the potentially severe and adverse side effects for law
enforcement and the public. Congress should therefore propose an
amendment to CALEA that prevents technology companies from
automating encryption on smartphones without the ability to decrypt
the same data. More specifically, if a user opts into encryption,
technology firms should be mandated to develop the requisite
technology to decrypt text messages and emails upon receiving a
valid warrant or court order.
A. Does Mandated Encryption Fit Within Katz?
A discussion of how courts may analyze mandated encryption
under Katz is appropriate to determine whether an individual has an
expectation of privacy for his encrypted smartphone data. As
mentioned previously, to have a defensible expectation of privacy, an
individual must have a subjective expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to accept as reasonable.152 If either one or both of the
elements required under Katz fail, law enforcement can conduct a
search without a warrant based on probable cause.153

150. See Bennett, supra note 142. “Technologists have pushed back, arguing any such requirement
would weaken encryption worldwide, lowering cybersecurity standards and leaving customers exposed
to cyber spies and cyber criminals.” Id.
151. Id.
152. See infra Part II.A.1; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
153. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 (1979).
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1. Under Apple’s New Encryption Systems, Do Smartphone
Owners Have A Subjective Expectation of Privacy in their
Electronic Communications?
Part one of Katz’s two-part test requires an individual to maintain
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy.154 Arguably, under
Apple’s encryption system on iOS 8 devices, courts may no longer
recognize an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy in his
communications or data on his smartphone if an individual is
unaware Apple is encrypting his data.155 With Apple’s iOS 8
operating system, all communications are now automatically
encrypted and inaccessible by Apple simply by using an iPhone with
a passcode.156 In contrast, Apple’s previous operating systems
required users who wanted secure, unbreachable encryption to
download additional software or use a messaging application that
utilized encryption, such as WhatsApp.157 If an iPhone user is
unaware of the automated encryption software utilized when he
establishes a passcode, his phones could be analogous to the locker in
Chadwick, except one lock—the passcode—exists rather than two.158
If the user is aware of Apple’s additional security, the password and
encryption would be more comparable to Chadwick’s double-lock,
where respondents believed the locker’s contents would remain free
from public examination.159
If individuals want to keep their communications private by
encrypting their data, then nothing should stop them from doing so,
and courts should appropriately find that an individual has a
legitimate subjective expectation of privacy.160 However, if a user
lacks knowledge of Apple’s new encryption software that makes it
154. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
155. Id.
156. Ken Gude, The FBI is Dead Wrong: Apple’s Encryption Is Clearly in the Public Interest,
WIRED (Oct. 17, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/fbi-is-wrong-apple-encryption-isgood/.
157. David Schuetz, A (Not So) Quick Primer on iOS Encrytpion, DARTHNULL.ORG (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.darthnull.org/2014/10/06/ios-encryption;
End-to-End
Encryption,
WHATSAPP,
https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/28030015 (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).
158. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
159. See id.
160. See id.
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mathematically impossible for Apple to unlock an iPhone’s operating
and encryption systems, then the court may potentially find the user
did not subjectively believe that his information was encrypted and
entirely inaccessible. Nonetheless, a court is exceedingly more likely
to find any smartphone owner, especially one whose phone requires a
passcode to access, maintains a subjective expectation of privacy in
the phone’s contents.161
2. Is Society Prepared to Recognize a Privacy Expectation in
Electronic Communications?
The second step taken from Katz requires that an expectation of
privacy be recognized by society as reasonable.162 Most often, courts
determine this analysis by weighing a citizen’s right to privacy and
his need to feel secure against the legitimate needs of law
enforcement.163 Thus, police activity may not constitute a “search” if
it seems “to invade relatively less significant privacy interests” and
promotes a legitimate governmental interest.164 The appropriate
analysis applied to Apple’s new encryption system is whether the
encrypted communications, specifically email and text, have the
same privacy interest as other traditional communications, such as
postcards and sealed letters, and whether society is ready to protect
those privacy interests at the cost of less effective law enforcement
investigations.165
When thinking about the purpose of text messages, the most
common use seems to be for casual, yet sometimes personal,
conversation. Although not a perfect comparison, text messages are
most categorically similar to the informal use of a postcard, which
161. See id.; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
162. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
163. Pesciotta, supra note 125, at 200; see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968).
164. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 729; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
165. Ryan A. Ray, The Warrantless Interception of Email: Fourth Amendment Search or Free Rein
for the Police?, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 178, 199–200 (2010). But see Marc McAllister,
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 475, 503–04 (2012).
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are not granted a reasonable expectation of privacy.166 This
categorization is drawn more distinctively when comparing texts to
more formal mediums of communications such as emails. Unlike text
messages, emails are the proper means to send more delicate matters,
for instance, a business’s financial records or an individual’s medical
records. Consequently, emails are comparable to sealed letters.167 For
both postal mail and emails, the envelope information, such as the
“to” and “from” address, is not protected while the communication’s
contents are safeguarded.168 In further applying the analogy of sealed
letters, once an individual opens an email, his expectation of privacy
is similarly terminated.169 Therefore, an email is likely to have
stronger privacy interests when compared to traditional forms of
communication than a text message.
Additionally, court decisions discussing whether “reasonable
expectations of privacy” exist have not always been congruent with
society’s perceptions.170 Since encrypted text messaging imposes a
significant setback for police investigations, the court should
consider additional factors to determine whether such a privacy
expectation is reasonable.171 For example, the FBI or NSA’s
argument that encrypting text messages puts the public’s safety at
166. See McArthur, supra note 122, at 127.
167. Ray, supra note 165, at 202. But see McArthur, supra note 122, at 127 (analogizing e-mails to
postcards, “where there are numerous opportunities for the message to be read by others on its way to its
intended recipient”).
168. Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-Mails Get
Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1049–50 (2008).
169. United States v. Jones, 149 Fed. Appx. 954, 959 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. King,
55 F.3d 1193, 1195–96 (6th Cir. 1995)).
170. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 164, at 733–34 (stating that most people disagree with the
ruling in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), that when one gives information to a bank, they
assume the risk that the information will be turned over to the government).
171. Id. at 754. Slobogin and Schumacher described Professor LaFave’s argument:
[T]he Court probably does not really believe that a person feels free to leave when
confronted by a uniformed police officer, but that its holdings to the contrary can
still be justified on the ground that, as a matter of policy, the police “should be
allowed ‘to seek cooperation, even where this may involve inconvenience or
embarrassment for the citizen, and even though many citizens will defer to this
authority of the police because they believe—in some vague way—that they
should.’”
Id. at 754 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth
Amendment “Sizures”?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 741 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 110.1, commentary at 258 (1975))).
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risk could be a legitimate interest that the court would consider in
determining whether encrypted texts maintain a reasonable
expectation of privacy.172
Despite these arguments, with our nation currently in the “postSnowden” era, it is unlikely that society would actually reject
individuals having a reasonable expectation of privacy in any aspects
of their phone, including text messages and emails.173 Even when an
individual believes the main goal of the criminal justice system is to
convict the guilty, individuals are not willing to give up their privacy
rights to effectively prosecute the guilty.174 Consequently, a warrant
would be required for law enforcement to access encrypted text
messages and emails, which is the current operating procedure for
law enforcement agencies.175
B. Amending CALEA
Regardless of law enforcement’s compliance with Katz, agencies
lack the capability to access encrypted data on Apple’s new
software.176 Currently, one of law enforcement’s only options to
access encrypted communications on smartphones is to purchase
expensive computers—with taxpayer money—that may successfully
carry out a brute force attack.177 Therefore, a compromise should be
negotiated between technology firms and law enforcement agencies
to balance competing interests.
President Obama commented during a 2016 interview that he
favored finding a solution supporting law enforcement.178 Yet, when
172. Comey, supra note 25.
173. Gude, supra note 156.
174. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 164, at 772–73.
175. Danny Yadron, Spencer Ackerman & Sam Thielman, Inside the FBI’s Encryption Battle with
Apple, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/17/inside-thefbis-encryption-battle-with-apple.
176. Id.
177. It can take as little as thirty minutes to correctly guess a four-digit password combination, but up
to five years for a six-digit alphanumeric password containing lower-case letters and numbers. Selyukh,
supra note 33.
178. Michael D. Shear, Obama, at South by Southwest, Calls for Law Enforcement Access in
Encryption Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/us/politics/obamaheads-to-south-by-southwest-festival-to-talk-about-technology.html.
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draft legislation was released early that same year, the technology
community fiercely opposed it because it would introduce
vulnerabilities in encryption.179 With the CALEA framework already
in existence, one possible solution is an amendment requiring carriers
who offer encryption to also have the capability to decrypt requested
data or specific communications, such as text messages, when served
with a valid warrant or court order.
In 1994, during the CALEA committee hearings, Clinton Brooks,
an assistant to the Director of the NSA, said the following words that
still ring true today, “We conclude that it would be irresponsible for
the government to promulgate excellent encryption for secure
communications and privacy that would preclude law enforcement
and national security authorities from protecting our Nation.”180
More recently, Sally Yates and James Comey stated that because of
the advances in electronic communication “the Government has lost
ground in its ability to execute court orders on communications not
covered by CALEA … we must work … to craft an approach that
addresses all of the multiple, competing legitimate concerns that have
been the focus of so much debate.”181 As illustrated in the floor
debate for CALEA in 1994, the competing concerns included privacy
protection, law enforcement capabilities, and the telecommunication
industry’s freedom to advance technologically.182 In the past,
Congress stepped in on two occasions prior to CALEA being enacted
to preserve an appropriate balance between privacy and law
enforcement as telecommunications technology continued to

179. Daniel Castro, The One Change That Would Make the Burr-Feinstein Encryption Bill Tenable,
HILL (Apr. 19, 2016, 6:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/276768-the-onechange-that-would-make-the-burr-feinstein-encryption.
180. Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Tech., Env’t & Aviation of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 103d Cong. 28 (1994)
(statement of Clinton Brooks, Special Assistance to the Director, National Security Agency).
181. Mark Bohannon, Encryption Back Doors: Is There More to This Debate?, OPENSOURCE.COM
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://opensource.com/government/15/9/encryption-back-doors-debate.
182. 140 CONG. REC. 27,707 (1994) (statement of Henry Hyde, member of the H. Subcomm. on Civil
Liberties and Civil Rights); Id. at 27,709 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman of the H.
Subcomm. on Civil Liberties and Civil Rights).
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advance.183 Currently, this same balance may need to be preserved by
amending CALEA.184
The current scope of CALEA ensures that “telecommunications
carriers have no responsibility to decrypt encrypted communications
that are the subject of court-ordered wiretaps, unless the carrier
provided the encryption and can decrypt it.”185 Although encryption
was deliberately excluded when CALEA was passed in 1994, the
debate as to whether that provision should now be excluded gathers
strength.186 A current example of a proposed CALEA amendment is
a change that would require communications services that encrypt
communications, such as text messages, to also have the technology
to unscramble the message so that law enforcement can carry out
their authorized wiretaps.187 This could also be facilitated by Apple
creating a software that would allow the FBI to try an unlimited
number of brute force attacks without delays between passcode
attempts.188 Rather than pushing an improbable sweeping policy on
encryption, a more focused proposal should be specific to companies
who automate encryption for text messages on their system, such as
Apple’s “Data Protection” which separately, yet automatically,
encrypts messages, mail, and contacts.189
Conversely, critics of expanding CALEA make a strong policy
argument against requiring access to encrypted communications.190
Opponents contend that in order to adequately protect businesses
from large data breaches, businesses should use stronger security
measures like robust encryption rather than weakening encryption by
requiring backdoors.191 It is critical to imagine, however, the unlikely
scenario where a company sends large amounts of highly sensitive

183. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, pt. 1, at 11–12 (1994).
184. But see Swire & Ahmad, supra note 9, at 473.
185. Soghoian, supra note 148.
186. Martin, supra note 81, at 158–60.
187. Soghoian, supra note 148.
188. See APPLE, INC., IOS SECURITY: IOS 9.3 OR LATER 12 (2016), https://www.apple.com/business/
docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf.
189. Id. at 11.
190. See generally Cohn, supra note 149.
191. Id.
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data over a text message.192 Thus, advocating for robust encryption
for email and text messages seems inappropriate when the result
would more readily affect victims of unsolved crimes rather than the
security of large companies. The effect of Apple throwing away the
key, whereas before Apple maintained a key,193 is even more
objectionable since Apple already requires a search warrant based on
probable cause before disclosing any customer’s information.194
Importantly, just as CALEA did not expand law enforcement’s
authority in 1994,195 neither would this proposed amendment seek to
do so now.196 Law enforcement agencies would still be required to
obtain a warrant before being granted authority to access an
individual’s text messages or emails. It would simply extend
CALEA’s reach to encompass a lower security level of
communications so that law enforcement can continue conducting
effective surveillance on criminals despite changing and emerging
technologies.197 Additionally, amending CALEA to encompass
encryption regulations would only give critics of CALEA more
leverage to add other provisions to the amendment that would favor
greater privacy protections.198 By enacting a CALEA amendment
that seeks to protect the public’s safety by reinforcing law
enforcement’s access to electronic communications conducted on
smartphones, privacy advocates can continue to maintain and
192. But see Gude, supra note 156. The author suggests that such a scenario is not far-fetched:
It is possible to construct a hypothetical scenario in which the only evidence of
criminal activity is stored on a suspect’s personal device, consists only of data not
backed up in cloud storage, and is not in the possession of third parties like
telecommunications carriers or app developers. But none of the criminal cases
cited by Comey meet that hypothetical because in real life those instances would
be extremely rare and far outweighed by the clear public benefit of preventing the
very real threat of a large-scale data breach that could affect millions of
Americans.
Id.
193. See Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy, APPLE (Jun. 16, 2013), http://www.apple.com/
apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/.
194. Privacy: Government Information Requests, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/
government-information-requests/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
195. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 9, at 421.
196. Going Dark, supra note 9, at 6–16.
197. Gene D. Park, Internet Wiretaps: Applying the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act to Broadband Services, 2 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 599, 609 (2006).
198. See BeVier, supra note 139, at 1091.
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promote electronic security in more compelling and critical
circumstances such as business transactions.
CONCLUSION
One of Congress’s greatest current challenges is “to balance the
competing demands of law enforcement, privacy rights, and
technological innovation.”199 Thus, as technology continues to
develop, courts must use existing frameworks and Congress must
adjust statutes to encompass emerging issues. With the recent
government abuses and ever-present data breaches, technology firms
have responded by mandating encryption on smartphones.200
Although the “post-Snowden” society may appreciate this response,
law enforcement agencies are handcuffed from adequately protecting
the public from both stateside and international threats.201 As a result
of embracing such a strict stance in favor of privacy, society may be
haunted by the negative consequences of protecting such a low
security level of communication such as text messages from being
accessed with a valid warrant or court order. Therefore, CALEA
should be amended to require Internet service providers and
telecommunication carriers who mandate encryption to also provide
the means to decrypt certain data and communications when law
enforcement has an authorized court order. Although the technology
firms are strongly opposed to such legislation, Congress may have no
choice but to weigh in on the matter by establishing a compromise
through CALEA to balance competing interests between civil
liberties, law enforcement needs, and public safety.202

199. Martin, supra note 81, at 159.
200. See, e.g., Gude, supra note 156 (discussing Apple’s increased encryption in response to data
breaches).
201. See generally Aaron Homer, The Director of the FBI Thinks Your iPhone’s Encryption Protects
Kidnappers, Terrorists and Pedophiles, INQUISITR (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/1538694/
the-director-of-the-fbi-thinks-your-iphones-encryption-protects-kidnappers-terrorists-and-pedophiles/;
Scripps News/Toronto Star Investigation Reveals How Encryption Technology Hampers Law
Enforcement, supra note 142.
202. Martin, supra note 81, at 158–60.
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